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Abstract:  
A 2005 prisoner health survey found that almost three quarters of the New Zealand prison 
population identified as smokers. Tobacco was deeply engrained in prison culture and smoking 
was viewed as an aid for managing the stress and boredom associated with prison life. The 
Department of Corrections implemented a policy on 1 July 2011, banning smoking in all areas of 
all prisons in New Zealand. The policy aimed to improve the long-term health of prisoners, and 
create a healthier workplace environment. Arthur Taylor, a notorious and litigious criminal, 
successfully challenged the delegated legislation implementing the policy by way of judicial review. 
This paper argues that the judicial reasoning was flawed, as it was based on erroneous assumptions 
without a thorough assessment and interpretation of the legislative history. Despite Taylor’s 
successful claims, the smoking ban was then incorporated into primary legislation. This paper 
examines the method of implementation, finding issues with retrospective and privative clauses 
introduced by a late stage supplementary order paper. Prisoners are a group especially vulnerable 
to curtailment of rights and freedoms, and this paper concludes that removal of the freedom to 
smoke in prison cells and outside in prison yards was a step too far. 
 
 
Key words: Judicial Review, Corrections Act 2004, New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
Smoke-free Environments Act 1990, Prisoners. 
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I Introduction 
Tobacco has long been deeply embedded in prison culture.1 Almost three quarters of New 
Zealand’s prisoners are smokers, a proportion three times higher than the general 
population.2 Under previous Corrections policy, prisoners were free to smoke in their cells 
and other designated areas.3 From 1 July 2011 the New Zealand Government implemented 
a blanket smoking ban. This ban affected all prisoners, whether convicted or on remand, at 
all times and in all areas of prisons. Smoking is a lawful activity outside of prison, subject 
to restrictions in the Smoke-free Environments Act 1990.   
 
The blanket ban resulted in two successful judicial review challenges by a notorious career 
criminal, Arthur Taylor. I analyse these decisions of the High Court of New Zealand, 
Taylor v Manager of Auckland Prison and Taylor v Attorney-General.4 Taylor successfully 
sought declarations that the Crown had acted ultra vires and unlawfully in implementing 
the smoking ban. I argue these judgments were flawed in their treatment of the Smoke-free 
Environments Act and made erroneous assumptions about the legislation without a 
thorough assessment and interpretation of the legislative history.  
 
Although the ban has been incorporated into primary legislation, constitutional issues in 
this incorporation warrant a closer look. Legislative provisions were given retrospective 
application. The ouster provisions contained in the amendments prevent further claims 
questioning the validity of the rules and regulations that enforce the ban. The 
implementation of the ban, through supplementary order paper, sidestepped important 
safeguards. I argue that a potential inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights was 
not identified as a result. The effect of the ouster clause may not be comprehensive and the 
government may have left themselves open to future claims.  
 
                                                 
1 R Richmond and others “Tobacco in prisons: a focus group study” (2009) 18(3) Tob Control 176. 
2 Kirsten Lindbery and Ken Huang “Results from the Prisoner Health Survey 2005” (Ministry of Health, 
Occasional Bulletin No 37, December 2006) at 28. 
3 Department of Corrections “Prisoner smoking ban set for 1 July 2011” (press release, 28 June 2010) 
4 Taylor v Manager of Auckland Prison [2012] NZHC 3591; Taylor v Attorney-General [2013] NZHC 
1659. 
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I believe that the government, attempting to implement a novel and controversial smoking 
ban, should have sought parliamentary and public sanction through primary legislative 
processes and select committee scrutiny.  This would have been in line with constitutional 
principles and avoided two High Court declarations of illegality. The lack of scrutiny is 
especially relevant in this context, as the ban was likely inconsistent with the Bill of Rights 
and therefore the opportunity to issue a s 7 report to that effect was missed.  
 
II Procedural History  
In June 2010, the Department of Corrections announced that a total smoking ban would be 
implemented in all New Zealand prisons from 1 July 2011.5 The aim of this policy was to 
improve the long-term health of prisoners, and create a healthier workplace environment.6 
In the year following the announcement, a nationwide campaign was carried out to inform 
and support prisoners in preparation for the ban. The ban denied prisoners access to an 
activity lawful outside of prison, including remand prisoners who are still presumed by law 
to be innocent.7 This significant policy change did not follow a consultation or public 
submission process and did not have democratic endorsement. Instead, prison managers 
were directed to make a rule under s 33 of the Corrections Act.   
 
The first High Court decision found that the rule was outside what Parliament must have 
intended to be an appropriate rule under s 33. The second decision examined the validity 
of the subsequent regulations, which were also held to be outside the scope of the relevant 
empowering provision and therefore invalid. In both decisions, the secondary legislation 
was considered by the court to be in conflict with s 6A of the Smoke-free Environments 
Act. 
 
                                                 
5 Department of Corrections, above n 3. 
6 Taylor v Manager of Auckland Prison, above n 4, at [2] 
7 Subject to the restrictions in the Smoke-free Environments Act 1990. 
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A Taylor v Manager of Auckland Prison: Prison Rule Unlawful 
On 1 June 2011, the manager of Auckland Prison made a rule prohibiting smoking on 
Auckland Prison property. The rule was made in line with a sample rule provided to all 
prisoner managers by the Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections and was to be 
effective from 1 July 2011:8 
 
Prisoner Instruction – Auckland Prison Smoking Policy 
Pursuant to Section 33 of the Corrections Act 2004, I am instituting a rule that forbids 
any prisoner smoking tobacco or any other substance, or have in possession any 
tobacco or tobacco related item on Auckland prison property…Furthermore prisoners 
are also forbidden from smoking while on temporary removal from Auckland Prison. 
 
Tobacco and smoking-related items were reclassified as unauthorised items in the Prison 
Services Operation Manual, and on the day the rule came into force tobacco and smoking-
related products were removed from the list of authorised items prisoners were able to 
purchase.  
 
Arthur Taylor, a non-smoking prisoner at Auckland Prison, brought proceedings in the 
High Court to challenge, by way of judicial review, the validity of the rule made under the 
Corrections Act.9 Taylor sought an order declaring that the rule was invalid and of no effect. 
The first ground of challenge was that the prison manager had no power under the 
Corrections Act to impose a total ban on smoking in all areas of the prison, including 
cells.10 Gilbert J examined the scope of the rule-making power under s 33 in the light of its 
purpose, reviewing the Corrections Act as a whole and other relevant legislation.11 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 At [3]. 
9 At [7]. 
10 At [7]. 
11 At [11]. 
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Section 33 of the Corrections Act provides:12 
 
 (1) The chief executive may, subject to subsection (6), authorise the manager of a 
corrections prison to make rules that the manager considers appropriate for the 
management of the prison and for the conduct and safe custody of the prisoners 
 
A review of the legislative context centred on the impact of the Smoke-free Environments 
Act. Enacted in 1990 as a response to growing public health concerns, the Smoke-free 
Environments Act seeks to reduce non-smokers’ exposure to detrimental health effects 
caused by exposure to second-hand smoke.13 Different requirements are imposed by the 
Smoke-free Environments Act in respect of different prison areas.14  Smoking is restricted 
in the parts of the prison that fall under the definition of “workplace” in s 2. The Smoke-
free Environments Act does not restrict smoking in the prison yard at Auckland Prison as 
it is open overhead and falls within the s 2 definition of an “open area”. Of most relevance 
to the High Court’s decision, Parliament had specifically addressed smoking in cells in s 
6A:15 
 
6A Smoking in prison cells 
(1) The superintendent of a prison must ensure that there is a written policy on smoking 
in the prison’s cells, prepared for the protection of the health of employees and 
inmates.  
 
Gilbert J found the purported rule to be inconsistent with s 6A. He found it clear from 
s 6A that prisoners retained the right to smoke in their cells, subject to the written 
policy required by the statute.16 The favoured interpretation was that this policy was 
intended to control but not prohibit smoking. Prison cells are excluded from the 
definition of “workplace” under s 2 and Gilbert J found nothing to suggest Parliament 
intended to remove the right to smoke either in cells or the prison yard.17  
                                                 
12 Corrections Act 2004, s 33. 
13 Smoke-free Environments Act 1990, s 3A(1)(a). 
14 At [17]. 
15 Section 6A 
16 At [22]. 
17 The prison yard qualifies as an open area under s 2 of the Smoke-free Environments Act. 
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The rule was also held to be outside the scope of the purposes of the empowering 
Act, laid out in ss 5 and 6 of the Corrections Act. A blanket ban on smoking by 
prisoners in all areas does not serve the purpose of ensuring that sentences are 
administered in a safe, secure, humane and effective manner.18 The ban was also 
found to conflict with the guiding principle that sentences should be administered no 
more restrictively than is necessary to ensure the safety of the public, corrections 
staff and other prisoners.19 
 
Before the delivery of the judgment, the government had already moved to amend 
regulations through the Corrections Amendment Regulations 2012. These 
regulations were not retrospective and therefore did not affect the decision. Gilbert J 
held that at the time the rule was made, it was inconsistent with reg 158(1)(h) of the 
Corrections Regulations 2005. Prior to November 2012, reg 158(1)(h) had exempted 
tobacco from the list of privileges that may be forfeited as a penalty imposed on a 
prisoner under the Corrections Act. Therefore, the rule purporting to remove the right 
to possess tobacco was inconsistent with that regulation. Any rule made under s 33 
must not be inconsistent with regulations made under the Corrections Act.20 
 
The second ground of challenge alleged that, if the Chief Executive did have power under 
the Act to make the rule, he did not properly exercise his discretion.21 It was not necessary 
for Gilbert J to decide this alternative ground as the first ground was made out.22 However, 
Gilbert J considered that the manager had acted under direction from the Chief Executive.  
The rule was simply made in line with the sample rule received that same day, without 
genuine assessment of the circumstances at Auckland Prison as required by s 33.23  
 
                                                 
18 At [31]. 
19 At [31]. 
20 Section 33(5). 
21 At [7]. 
22 At [32]. 
23 At [33]. 
9 
 
 
The government submitted that any declaration of unlawfulness should be delayed for six 
months, stating that it would be disruptive to reintroduce tobacco to the prison environment 
and would detrimentally affect the entire prison population and staff. It was also submitted 
that Taylor had no legitimate reason to wish to smoke and was not affected by the rule. 
These submissions were readily dismissed by Gilbert J. Taylor did not lack standing, and 
the fact that he was less affected by the rule than other prisoners was not considered a good 
reason to delay the relief that would normally follow a successful application for judicial 
review.24 After finding that the ban on smoking had unlawfully restricted the rights of over 
600 prisoners, Gilbert J made an order declaring that the rule banning smoking in all areas 
of Auckland Prison was unlawful, invalid and of no effect.25 
  
B Government Response to Ruling 
Despite the court ruling the government was determined to keep prisons smoke-free. The 
Corrections Minister endorsed the success of the policy since introduction, and confirmed 
the priority of removing any potential uncertainty of its lawfulness.26 The Corrections 
Regulations 2005 were amended by the Corrections Amendment Regulations 2012 before 
the delivery of the first judgment.27 Therefore, even if the High Court found the prison rule 
to be unlawful, the regulations would operate independently to continue the smoking ban. 
Arthur Taylor filed proceedings on 7 January 2013 challenging these new regulations.28  
 
Subsequent to the filing of proceedings, Supplementary Order Paper 171 (SOP 171) was 
tabled on 12 February 2013.29 SOP 171 proposed to amend the Corrections Amendment 
Bill 2011, which was already in the later stages of the enactment process and had not until 
then addressed smoking in prisons. The effect of the amendments included in SOP 171 was 
to incorporate the ban into primary legislation. The definition of unauthorised item in s 3(1) 
                                                 
24 At [37]. 
25 At [40]. 
26 (26 February 2013) 687 NZPD 8186 
27 The Corrections Amendment Regulations 2012 commenced on 2 November 2012.  
28 Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [9]. 
29 Supplementary Order Paper 2013 (171) Corrections Amendment Bill 2011 (330-3).  
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of the Corrections Act was amended to include tobacco and related equipment.30 Smoking 
was made a disciplinary offence under s 129.31 Section 6A of the Smoke-free Environments 
Act was repealed and the “prison cell” exemption was removed from the ban on smoking 
in the workplace.32 
 
The new s 179AA(1) retrospectively validated previous rules made by prison managers 
before 12 February 2013 by providing that they be treated as if they were made after Part 3 
of the Bill came into force.33 Part 3 repeals s 6A of the Smoke-free Environments Act.34 
Therefore, the rules could no longer be considered to be in conflict with the Smoke-free 
Environments Act. SOP 171 also included an ouster clause. Section 179AA(2) prevents, 
from 12 February 2013, the bringing of further proceedings against the Crown “questioning 
the validity” of the rules and regulations. Section 179AA(3) restricts relief in proceedings 
relating to the regulations to the period preceding 12 February 2013.35  
 
SOP 171 was considered by the Committee of the Whole House the next day and the 
amendments were narrowly passed. The Bill received Royal Assent on 4 March 2013 and 
the smoking ban is now encapsulated in primary legislation. 
 
C Taylor v Attorney-General: Regulations Unlawful 
Taylor’s second judicial review challenged the validity of the Corrections Amendment 
Regulations 2012.36 The Corrections Amendment Act 2013 had come into force before 
proceedings began. Therefore under New Zealand law, prisoners are banned from 
possessing tobacco and smoking tobacco is a disciplinary offence under the Corrections 
Act. Even if the regulations were declared unlawful, the smoking ban would still remain in 
force as the policy was now enshrined in legislation. Brewer J nevertheless saw public 
                                                 
30 At 1.  
31 At 1.  
32 At 3.   
33 At 2.  
34 At 3.  
35 At 2. 
36 Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [9]. 
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utility in addressing allegations of government misuse of a coercive power, especially 
where a freedom otherwise enjoyed by the public had been restricted.37  There was also 
practical utility in delivering judgment, as those who had been disciplined before the 
regulations were retrospectively validated could apply for relief.38  
 
The Corrections Amendment Regulations 2012 came into force on 2 November 2012 and 
amended the Corrections Regulations 2005.39 Regulation 4 inserted a new reg 32A, which 
declared tobacco and any equipment used for smoking tobacco to be unauthorised items.40 
This is significant because prison officers can conduct cell searches and strip-searches 
where there is a reasonable belief in the presence of an unauthorised item.41 Secondly, 
regulation 6 amended reg 158(1)(h) by deleting the reference to “tobacco" in the list of 
privileges that could not be suspended as disciplinary treatment.42 This removed the 
conflict between regulations made under the Corrections Act and the original s 33 rule.  
 
The issue before Brewer J was whether the Corrections Act authorised the regulations. 
Sections 200 and 201 of the Corrections Act confer the relevant power.43 Section 200 
provides that the Governor-General may make regulations covering a broad span of prison 
management areas, such as to ensure the “good management of prisons” and to prescribe 
the “powers and functions of staff members of prisons”.44 Section 201 elaborates on, 
without limiting, the s 200 powers. The Governor-General may regulate to ensure safe 
custody and to control granting and removal of privileges.45 
 
 
                                                 
37 At [13]. 
38 At [14]. 
39 Corrections Amendment Regulations 2012, reg 2. 
40 Reg 4. 
41 Corrections Act, s 98. 
42 Reg 6. 
43 At [19]. 
44 Section 201(a) and (b). 
45 Section 201(d). 
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The main argument advanced by Taylor was that the Corrections Act cannot authorise 
regulations contrary to other statutes. The Crown submitted that regulations reducing the 
likelihood of tobacco being available in prisons were in line with the wider Smoke-free 
Environments Act purpose of reducing smoking. I will later argue that this submission 
should not have been dismissed. However, Brewer J agreed with Gilbert J that the 
Smoke-free Environments Act recognises an existing right of prisoners to smoke, 
confirmed by the exclusion of cells from the ban of smoking in workplaces.46 Brewer J also 
agreed with Gilbert J’s view that banning tobacco was inconsistent with the purposes and 
guiding principles of the overall corrections system.47 The judgment highlighted the 
inhumane nature of forcing prisoners into nicotine withdrawal and the restrictive nature of 
depriving prisoners of an otherwise lawful substance.48  
 
It was held that the purpose of the Smoke-free Environments Act in this area is to require 
policies balancing the rights of smokers and non-smokers rather than conferring an absolute 
right to acquire, possess and smoke tobacco.49 The explanatory note to the 2012 regulations 
stated that reg 158(1)(h) was necessary to remove an inconsistency with the reg 32A ban.50  
Brewer J held that this purpose meant reg 32A was ultra vires, but it would have been 
within the scope of the s 201 power if it had been amended for the purpose of discipline 
rather than to remove an inconsistency.51 
 
Brewer J made a declaration that reg 4 (which inserted reg 32A) and reg 6 (which amended 
reg 158(1)(h)) of the Corrections Amendment Regulations 2012 were unlawful, invalid and 
of no effect.52 It was recognized that the utility of the decision was subject to the 
Corrections Amendment Act 2013.53 For a second time, the High Court declared the 
smoking ban in Auckland Prison to be unlawful.  
                                                 
46 At [30]. 
47 At [31]. 
48 At [31]. 
49 At [31]. 
50 Corrections Amendment Regulations 2012 (explanatory note). 
51 At [32]. 
52 At [35]. 
53 At [36]. 
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III Critique of Judgments 
Parliament, as supreme law-maker, often delegates law-making powers to the executive 
branch. The practice of delegated legislation has been described as “indispensable” to 
modern government, due to time pressures and the complexity of the wide-ranging subject 
matter.54 Judicial review of delegated legislation plays an important role in upholding the 
rule of law and sovereignty of Parliament.55 The risk that the executive will use delegated 
powers to legislate on substantive policy is counterbalanced by the power of the High Court 
to ensure that this authority is exercised in accordance with the power creating it, and in 
the spirit of the enabling statute.56 
 
Regulation and rule-making powers are also limited by legislation outside of the 
empowering provision. The doctrine of repugnancy provides that, unless permitted by the 
empowering statute, subordinate legislation may not override or otherwise be inconsistent 
with an Act.57 From this it follows that secondary legislation cannot permit activity that a 
statute expressly forbids, nor forbid that which a statute expressly permits.58 The dominant 
argument advanced in both cases was that the smoking ban, firstly through the rule, and 
secondly the regulations, was inconsistent with the Smoke-free Environments Act 1990. 
The Smoke-free Environments Act, as a Parliamentary enactment, is a higher source of 
law. It is often argued that subordinate legislation cannot repeal or interfere with the 
operation of any statute without authority of Parliament itself.59 However, every statutory 
instrument under an Act could be regarded as having the effect of altering the Act. 
 
 
                                                 
54 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2014) at 1103. 
55 Joseph, above n 54, at 1103. 
56 Ross Carter, Jason McHerron and Ryan Malone Subordinate Legislation in New Zealand (Lexis Nexis, 
Wellington, 2013) at 228. 
57 Carter, McHerron and Malone, above n 56, at 265. 
58 Powell v May [1946] KB 330 at 335. 
59 Combined State Unions v State Services Co-ordinating Committee [1982] 1 NZLR 742 (CA) at 745. 
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A better view may be that “repugnancy” requires fundamental or irreconcilable differences 
with the primary legislation.60 This would require more than simple proof that secondary 
legislation deals with matters covered by another enactment.61 I contend that the 
inconsistency between the Smoke-free Environments Act and the delegated legislation at 
issue in the Taylor decisions is not fundamentally irreconcilable. This argument is explored 
below, concluding that the written policy required under s 6A does not require an 
affirmation of a right to smoke in cells and therefore the delegated legislation cannot 
properly be said to be “repugnant” to the Smoke-free Environments Act. There were no 
guidelines as to what the policy could or could not cover, and the rules and regulations 
could be viewed as filling in this gap rather than operating inconsistently with the existing 
legislation.  
A Inconsistency with the Smoke-free Environments Act 1990 
Both High Court judgments favoured the same interpretation of the Smoke-free 
Environments Act. Gilbert J found, and Brewer J agreed, that the Smoke-free 
Environments Act intended that prisoners would retain the right to smoke in their cells.62 
Parliament was held to have intended smoking in prison cells to be regulated by the 
required policy under s 6A rather than through delegated legislation, specifically the rule 
made under s 33 or regulations made under s 200 of the Corrections Act.63 I argue that the 
interpretation of s 6A is not as unequivocal as the judgment suggests and in fact warrants 
a closer look. The assumptions made by both judges are flawed and this taints the decisions 
reached. This argument is based on an examination of the legislative history, which reveals 
no intention from Parliament to expressly permit smoking in cells.  
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Joseph, above n 54, at 1126. 
61 Dean Knight “Power to make bylaws” (2005) NZLJ 165 at 167.  
62 Taylor v Manager of Auckland Prison, above n 4, at [22]; Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [31]. 
63 Taylor v Manager of Auckland Prison, above n 4, at [28]. 
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The Smoke-free Environments Act must be interpreted from its text and in light of its 
purpose.64 On its plain text, s 6A required the superintendent of a prison to ensure there is 
a written policy on smoking in the prison’s cells, prepared for the protection of the health 
of employees and inmates. Managers have an obligation to ensure good management and 
safe custody and welfare of prisoners.65 The policy had to be based on guiding principles 
laid out in s 6A(2): 66 
 
 (i) as far as is reasonably practicable, an employee or inmate who does not smoke, or 
who does not wish to smoke in the prison, must be protected from smoke arising from 
smoking in the prison’s cells: 
(ii) unless it is not reasonably practicable to do otherwise, an inmate who does not 
wish to smoke in his or cell must not be required to share it with an inmate who does 
wish to smoke in it 
 
The argument accepted by the courts was based on an implication that prisoners had the 
right to smoke in their cell, as Parliament would have made it clear that smoking was not 
permitted in s 6A if a ban was allowed. I do not find strong support for this assumption 
from the wording of the legislation. The converse argument should also be considered. If 
Parliament had intended smoking to be an activity allowed to continue, this could have 
been expressly stated in s 6A. Such an express permission for employers to allow smoking 
exists elsewhere in the Smoke-free Environments Act. Under s 5A an employer may permit 
smoking in a vehicle provided by the employer where there is consent from all passengers. 
Under s 6 employers in hospital care institutions and rest homes may allocate a dedicated 
smoking room. Smoking is also permitted in a small passenger service vehicle (other than 
an operating taxi) where the driver and every passenger in the vehicle agree that smoking 
shall be permitted.67 These examples show that if Parliament had intended to permit 
smoking in prison cells, subject to a written policy, it could have used similar permissive 
language to say a superintendent “may” permit smoking. 
                                                 
64 Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1). 
65 Corrections Act, s 5(1)(a). 
66 Smoke-free Environments Act, s 6A(2). 
67 Smoke-free Environments Act, s 9(3). 
16 
 
 
I will now consider the legislative history and purposes of the Smoke-free Environments 
Act to reveal the flaws in judicial reasoning. There is no suggestion either in the legislative 
history, or the statutory purposes included in the legislation, that Parliament intended to 
protect the right to smoke. Instead, analysis shows that these factors point towards 
supporting a smoking ban, as it better serves the purpose of reducing non-smokers exposure 
to smoke. 
1 Legislative History 
Neither judgment conducted an enquiry into the legislative history.68 Section 6A was 
implemented under the Smoke-free Environments Amendment Act 2003. These 
amendments expanded prior restrictions, imposing a total ban on smoking in all indoor 
workplaces including prisons.69 On Gilbert J’s interpretation of the definition in s 5, this 
would include all internal areas of prison buildings excluding cells. 
 
Section 6A replaced s 6(2) which had allowed smoking in prison cells as well as permitting 
prison managers to designate indoor common areas as ‘permitted’ smoking areas. There 
was no significant change relating to smoking in cells in the 2003 amendment, but the 
amendments did remove the permission to designate an indoor common smoking area. This 
permission remains for employers in hospital care institutions, residential disability care 
institutions, and rest homes.70 This appears to be another indication that Parliament did not 
intend there to be a right to smoke in prisons. The changes removed practical difficulties 
resulting from partial restriction of smoking in prison areas.71  
 
The select committee report on s 6A recognised that the prison cell exclusion in s 5 was 
based on the principle that a cell is like a prisoner’s home, even if only temporarily.72 The 
practice at the time was to allow smoking in cells and outdoor areas only. The report 
recommended that all prisons should be required to have a written policy regarding 
                                                 
68 Hanna Wilberg “Administrative Law” [2013] NZ L Rev 715 at 727. 
69 Ministry of Health “Smoke-free Environments Amendment Act 2003” <www.health.govt.nz>. 
70 Smoke-free Environments Act, s 6. 
71 Richard Edwards and others “After the Smoke has Cleared” Evaluation of the Impact of a New Smokefree 
Law” (Ministry of Health, December 2006) at 70. 
72 Smoke-free Environments (Enhanced Protection) Amendment Bill (310-2) (select committee report) at 4. 
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smoking in cells and emphasised that prisoners may be allowed to smoke in their own cells 
so long as non-smokers are not required to share a cell with them.73 However, this does not 
support an unequivocal argument that smoking must be allowed in cells.  The failure to 
include a ban on smoking in cells in the Smoke-free Environments Act could have been 
due to a lack of sufficient information as to the feasibility of such a ban.74 There is no 
suggestion in the legislative history that Parliament intended prisoners to be protected from 
second hand smoke by restricting smoking by the least means possible. 
 
2 Purposes of the Smoke-free Environments Act 
The reduction of smoking by smokers is not one of the stated purposes of the Smoke-
free Environments Act.75 Section 6A contains a statutory directive that prison 
managers must ensure that there is a written policy on smoking in prison cells. Gilbert 
J’s acceptance that s 6A requires a policy that permits smoking goes beyond the fairer 
interpretation that it may simply contemplate such a policy. The purposes of the 
Smoke-Free Environments Act are laid out in s 3A. The most relevant purpose hereis 
s 3A(1): 
3A Purposes of this Act 
(1) The purposes of this Act are, in general, as follows: 
(a) to reduce the exposure of people who do not themselves smoke to any detrimental 
effect on their health caused by smoking by others. 
 
S 6A is located in Part 1 of the Act, which contains its own purpose section. The relevant 
purpose is:76 
(a) to prevent the detrimental effect of other people's smoking on the health of people 
in workplaces, or in certain public enclosed areas, who do not smoke or do not 
wish to smoke there. 
                                                 
73 At 4. 
74 Wilberg, above n 68, at 727. 
75 Progressive Meats Ltd v Ministry of Health [2008] NZCA 162, [2008] NZAR 633 at [39]. 
76 Smoke-free Environments Act, s 4(a). 
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These wider purposes, I argue, show the key driver behind the Smoke-free Environments 
Act is more acceptably to protect inmates and staff from second hand smoke. This far from 
entrenches a right to smoke. Where the purpose of an Act is sufficiently clear, it may prevail 
over the text of a relevant part of it.77 The policy required by s 6A should ensure that as far 
as reasonably practicable those that do not wish to smoke should not be exposed to smoke. 
There are no further guidelines about what the policy was entitled to cover or not cover.  
 
I argue it strains the interpretation of s 6A to require a policy that expressly permits and 
affirms a right to smoke in prison cells. The Crown submission, although dismissed by 
Brewer J, was that a policy banning smoking was the best way to serve the wider purpose 
of reducing harm to non-smokers.78 There does not seem to be a logical reason why a policy 
banning smoking would not serve this purpose, simply because a lesser policy may have 
been sufficient.  Both High Court decisions neglected to consider the legislative history of 
the Smoke-free Environments Act, or adequately assess the wider legislative purpose. For 
these reasons, the decisions are not robust. The ban has now been formalised into primary 
legislation and I will now consider the wider issues that arose with this implementation.  
 
IV Wider Issues with Implementation of Ban 
Despite two successful judicial review claims, smoking and the possession of tobacco is 
now banned in prisons throughout New Zealand. However the method of statutory 
implementation leaves itself open to criticism. Here, I will discuss the bypass of important 
vetting stages that stemmed from the enactment of a supplementary order paper at a late 
stage of the legislative process. Some provisions contained in this supplementary order 
paper had retrospective effect and restrict potential for future challenges, and yet there was 
no public submission, select committee scrutiny or vetting by the Attorney-General for 
inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. I will argue that s 7 vetting 
would have revealed an inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, which 
bolsters the claim that statutory implementation bypassed important constitutional 
safeguards. 
                                                 
77 JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2009) at 212. 
78 Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [29]. 
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A Supplementary Order Paper 171 
After the prison rule was declared to be invalid and unlawful, the Government had to react. 
There was clear intention to proceed with the prison smoking policy, and I argue the next 
step should have been to go through Parliamentary processes to sanction the policy through 
legislative change. In the health sector, Waitemata District Health Board took a “slow and 
cautious” approach when banning smoking on hospital grounds. This serves as a useful 
example of an authority introducing such a policy without disregard for the wider 
legislative context.79 However, in the interim between the first and second High Court 
judgments, Supplementary Order Paper 171 was tabled. Supplementary order papers can 
be prepared and tabled in the House at any time up to and including the committee of the 
whole House stage of a Bill.80 The amendments incorporated in this paper have been 
detailed earlier. 
 
SOP 171 was derided in Parliament for being introduced “at the eleventh hour”.81 It was 
tabled only after the Corrections Amendment Bill 2011 had been reported back from the 
Law and Order Select Committee. Opposition members called the supplementary order 
paper the most “insidious” part of the Bill and concerns were expressed about passing a 
law that had not withstood public or select committee scrutiny.82 The following analysis 
will cover issues surrounding the scope of the empowering bill, the retrospective nature of 
new provisions therein contained, potential inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act and the controversial exclusion of ongoing review jurisdiction.  
 
 
 
                                                 
79 B v Waitemata District Health Board [2013] NZHC 1702, [2013] NZAR 937 at [48]. 
80 Legislation Advisory Committee “Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation: 2001 edition and 
amendments” (May 2001) <www.justice.govt.nz/lac> at 17.2.2. 
81 (26 February 2013) 687 NZPD 8186. 
82 (26 February 2013) 687 NZPD 8186. 
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1 Amendments Outside Scope of Empowering Bill  
Aside from any Bill of Rights issues that I will canvas later, an immediate concern with 
SOP 171 is that it contains provisions outside the scope of the Bill that it amends. The 
Speakers’ Rulings provide that “an amendment or new clause must be within the scope or 
purview of the bill, as defined by its contents as originally introduced.” 83 
 
By using the Corrections Amendment Bill to introduce anti-smoking measures, the 
government introduced major new substantive parts to the Bill with only a remote 
connection to the initial purpose. The Legislation Advisory Committee (LAC) Guidelines 
state that any amendment to a Bill proposed after introduction should be within the scope 
of the Bill as introduced.84 This discourages Parliament from passing laws that have not 
been clearly signalled to the public or the House, without proper scrutiny.85 SOP 171 had 
the purpose of expressly including the smoking ban in primary legislation after the first 
successful judicial review. A second challenge to subsequent regulations had been filed, 
and proceedings were underway.  
 
Although the SOP did seek to amend the Corrections Act, LAC Guidelines state that:86 
 
…an SOP to an amending Bill, dealing with one Part of the Act which the Bill amends, 
may be outside the scope of a Bill which, as introduced, deals only with another Part 
of that Act. 
 
The Corrections Amendment Bill was originally focused on strip-search procedures, 
prisons managed under contract and the quality of prison health services.87 The provisions 
in SOP 171 focused on amending clearly different parts of the Corrections Act. SOP 171 
also included amendments to the Smoke-free Environment Act, legislation which was not 
previously within the purview of the Bill. The Law Society has recently expressed concerns 
                                                 
83 Speakers’ Rulings 2012, at 118. 
84 At 17.3.1. 
85 At 17.3.1. 
86 At 17.3.1 
87 (28 February 2012) 677 NZPD 617. 
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about such practices, where a similar late stage SOP introduced new provisions with wide 
ranging effect without subjection to public scrutiny.88 When a SOP contains amendments 
to a bill that are out of scope, the House technically needs to issue an instruction before the 
committee can consider it and this was another vetting procedure that did not occur.89 
SOP 171 was introduced on the 11th February and was considered by committee of the 
whole house two days later.90 
 
2 Amendments Have Retrospective Effect 
Provisions included in SOP 171 have retrospective effect. This was viewed in the House 
as a “particularly concerning” element of the SOP.91 Laws should generally be prospective 
rather than retrospective.92 SOP 171 proposed to validate retrospectively the rules or 
regulations made under the Corrections Act before 12 February 2013 by providing that 
they must be treated after the relevant part of the Bill came into force. The second High 
Court decision, in declaring these regulations invalid, held that prisoners who had 
disciplinary action taken against them between the implementation of the regulations and 
the subsequent retrospective validation could seek administrative relief.93 Nevertheless, 
there is still a period of time where the legislation retrospectively validated regulations and 
therefore applied new law to old events.94 Legislation should not create penalties 
retrospectively.95 An adverse disciplinary record can affect consideration of parole.96 If the 
ouster clauses in SOP 171 operate to preclude judicial relief for disciplinary action over 
this period, then prisoners could have been punished for smoking when it was not unlawful 
at the time of the offence.  
                                                 
88 New Zealand Law Society “Minister urged to call for submissions on SOP” (09 July 2013) 
<www.lawsociety.org.nz>. 
89 Legislation Advisory Committee, above n 80, at 17.3.2. 
90 Corrections Amendment Bill 2011 (330-1). 
91 (13 February 2013) 687 NZPD 7832. 
92 Burrows and Carter, above n 77, at 586. 
93 Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [14]. 
94 The Amendment Act retrospectively validates the regulations from the 12 February 2013 and the 
regulations operated until the Corrections Amendment Act 2013 came into force on 5 March 2013. 
95 Legislation Advisory Committee, above n 80, at 3.3.3. 
96 Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [14]. 
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In summary, safeguards of the legislative process were circumvented. SOP 171 contains 
retrospective clauses, and was not within scope of the Bill it sought to amend. Furthermore, 
the use of a SOP to implement the policy precluded the Attorney-General from vetting the 
provisions for Bill of Rights inconsistencies. 
 
3 Amendments Inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 imposes an obligation on the 
Attorney-General to review proposed legislation upon introduction. The Attorney-General 
must report to the House of Representatives when any provision in any Bill appears to be 
inconsistent with any of the rights or freedoms included in the Bill of Rights.97 This 
reporting duty promotes compliance with the Bill of Rights in the legislative process.98 It 
also ensures that Parliament does not decide to limit a right or freedom without fully 
informed consideration or in ignorance of protected rights and freedoms.99  
 
Introducing the smoking ban to legislation through a SOP excluded the opportunity to make 
Bill of Rights considerations a significant focus in the formulation of the policy. LAC 
Guidelines warn officials to be alert for Bill of Rights inconsistencies in amendments to 
Bills including SOPs.100 While there is nothing to prevent the Attorney-General from 
alerting Parliament to inconsistencies at this stage, they are not under the same statutory 
obligation as at the introduction of the Bill.101 As a result, statutes may “slip onto the statute 
book” without the benefit of a formal report.102 
 
 
                                                 
97 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. 
98 Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003) at 
195. 
99 Joseph, above n 54, at 1277. 
100 Legislation Advisory Committee, above n 80, at 17.2.2. 
101 Nikki Pender and Pam McMillan “SOP sinks mining protestors” (2013) 817 LawTalk 18 at . 
102 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: a commentary (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2005).at 8.14.6.  
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Here I will consider whether there is an apparent inconsistency with any rights or freedoms 
contained in the Bill of Rights that would have triggered a s 7 report. It is relevant that the 
Attorney-General did not table a report for the Corrections Amendment Bill 2011 at its 
introduction.103 The original Bill extended disciplinary offences under the Corrections Act 
and extended search powers to an entirely new category of offences. This context may 
hinder an argument that a smoking ban would trigger a report of inconsistency, when the 
original Bill did not. The smoking ban also affects fundamental rights by introducing 
additional powers to search prisoners and their visitors for tobacco contraband.  
 
The reporting duty arises where a provision in the introductory copy of a Bill “appears to 
be inconsistent with a right or freedom”.104 Rights contained in the Bill of Rights are not 
absolute and s 7 cannot be read in isolation from the Bill of Rights as a whole.105 Section 
5 recognises that rights may be subject to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.106 In line with this, the practice of Attorney-
Generals has been to issue a report only where a provision in a Bill would impose an 
unreasonable limit on a right or freedom.107 In the second proceeding, Taylor alleged that 
the anti-smoking regulations undermine respect for the dignity of the person and are 
thereby an unjustified infringement of s 23(5) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
Brewer J declined to rule on whether the regulations breached the rights legislation, having 
already decided that they were not authorised by the Corrections Act. Here, I will consider 
whether Taylor’s allegation holds weight and whether an unjustified infringement of s 
23(5) did exist, such that a report would have been issued. The relevant right is:  
 
23 Rights of persons arrested or detained 
… 
(5) Everyone deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the person. 
                                                 
103 SOP 171 incorporated the smoking ban into this Bill.  
104 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 7. 
105 Rishworth, above n 98, at 197. 
106 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 5. 
107 Butler and Butler, above n 102, at 8.6.1.  
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The Supreme Court in Taunoa v Attorney-General considered that a breach of s 23(5) 
involves less reprehensible conduct than a breach of the s 9 right to freedom from torture.108 
Blanchard J stated that s 23(5) involves conduct “which lacks humanity, but falls short of 
being cruel; which demeans the person, but not to an extent which is degrading; or which 
is clearly excessive in the circumstances but not grossly so”.109 Section 23(5) was 
considered to impose a positive instruction to protect persons such as prisoners who are 
regarded as “particularly vulnerable”.110  
 
I argue that there is an apparent inconsistency with s 23(5) in this situation. The smoking 
ban enforced withdrawal from an addictive substance, and resulted in the loss of personal 
autonomy to make choices about whether to engage in a lawful activity. The ban therefore 
disrespects the inherent dignity of the person. In the course of proceedings, both Brewer J 
and Gilbert J considered the blanket ban to be “inhumane”.111 This concern was more 
significant in respect of remand prisoners who could find themselves “arrested, detained in 
custody, and forced to undergo nicotine withdrawal, all within the same day”.112 A 2000 
Report of the Royal College of Physicians concluded that “the extent to which smokers are 
addicted to nicotine is comparable with an addiction to ‘hard’ drugs such as heroin and 
cocaine”.113 Although cessation programmes were in place to mitigate the harmful effects 
of withdrawal, remand prisoners do not enjoy the benefits of the year-long lead up 
campaign available to existing inmates.  
 
If a provision is found to be apparently inconsistent with a right or freedom, as I argue is 
the case with the smoking ban, it may nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of Rights if 
it can be considered a reasonable limitation. Section 5 contemplates that the rights and 
                                                 
108 Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] NZLR 429 at [285]. 
109 At [177]. 
110 At [177]. 
111 Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [31]. 
112 Taylor v Manager of Auckland Prison, above n 4, at [5]. 
113 Royal College of Physicians of London Tobacco Advisory Group Nicotine Addiction in Britain: A Report 
of the Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians (Royal College of Physicians, London, 
2000). 
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freedoms set out in the Act are subject to reasonable and justifiable limitations.114 The s 5 
inquiry can be described as two-fold: whether the provision serves an important and 
significant objective, and whether there is a rational and proportionate connection between 
the provision and the objective.115   
 
Prison managers are under an obligation to ensure good management of prisons and the 
safe custody and welfare of prisoners.116 The objective of the ban, stated by Corrections, 
was to improve the long-term health of prisoners and create a healthier workplace 
environment.117 This is a significant objective, as smoking rates in prisons are 
disproportionally high compared to the general population.118 A reduction in exposure to 
second-hand smoke would be beneficial for the health of inmates and employees, and 
therefore it would be open to consider the ban a justified limitation. Although the restriction 
would be difficult, cessation aids were provided to assist the withdrawals.119 The High 
Court has considered nicotine replacement therapy to be a “humane and meaningful” 
treatment of a smoker’s deprivation symptoms.120 However, I argue that the smoking ban 
provisions do not have a rational and proportionate connection to the objective.  
 
When considering an objective that curtails prisoners’ freedoms, it is important to 
recognise that prisoners are at a greater risk than any other section of the community of 
suffering the kinds of deprivation or restriction which constitute an infringement of 
rights.121 This risk may be compounded by a pervasive public view that prisoners’ rights 
are “legitimately curtailed” as a consequence of their crimes.122 Supporters of this view 
                                                 
114 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 5. 
115 R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1. 
116 Corrections Act 2004, s 5(1)(a). 
117 Department of Corrections, above n 3. 
118 Kirsten Lindbery and Ken Huang, above n 2, at 28. 
119 Lucie Collinson and others “New Zealand’s smokefree prison policy appears to be working well: one year 
on” (2012) 125 NZMJ 164. 
120 B v Waitemata District Health Board, above n 79, at [72]. 
121 Gordon Hawkins Prisoners’ Rights: A Study of Human Rights and Commonwealth Prisoners (Australian 
Human Rights Commission, Occasional Paper No 12, September 1986) at 7. 
122 Hawkins, above n 121, at 9. 
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would believe that prisoners do not “deserve” the pleasure derived from smoking.123 The 
legislation imposes the ban on all prisoners in New Zealand regardless of classification. 
There is an important distinction between convicted prisoners and those held on remand. 
Convicted prisoners are detained as a means of punishment, whereas remand prisoners are 
detained for safe custody and to ensure attendance at trial.124 Under a blanket ban this 
distinction is not recognised. Remand prisoners, still presumed innocent by law, are forced 
into immediate nicotine withdrawal.  
 
There is no clear statement of prisoners’ rights set out in the primary or secondary 
legislation governing prison administration.125 The corrections system is required to 
administer custodial sentences in a safe, secure, humane and effective manner.126 
Imprisonment is characterised by a loss of control over normal activities and normal 
decisions of daily life.127 The extreme penalty of deprivation of freedom is joined by lesser 
curtailments such as limited choice of food and clothing. I agree with the view that a 
smoking ban represents the erosion of yet another freedom to an already disenfranchised 
group.128 Smoking has been described by prisoners as an aid for managing the stress and 
boredom associated with prison life.129 Those detained may feel disproportionately 
impacted by the removal of the ability to smoke, having so few liberties to begin with.130  
 
 
                                                 
123 Anita Mackay “Stubbing smoking out in prisons: bans are an ineffective mechanism” (2014) 39(2) Alt LJ 
99.  
124 G.D. Treverton-Jones Imprisonment: The Legal Status and Rights of Prisoners (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1989) at 38. 
125 Kathy Dunstall and Kris Gledhill “Prisoners” in Margaret Bedggood and Kris Gledhill (ed) Law into 
Action: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 
2011) 329 at 340. 
126 Corrections Act, s 5(1).  
127 Dunstall and Gledhill, above n 125, at 335. 
128 T Butler and others “Should smoking be banned in prisons?” (2007) 16(5) Tob Control 291. 
129 R Robertson and others, above n 1. 
130 Re CM (Judicial Review) [2013] CSOH 143. 
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Corrections chief executive Ray Smith has stated that the ban has created healthier, cleaner 
prisons and led to a significant drop in fires within prison buildings.131 However, 
I argue that the blanket ban goes beyond what was reasonably necessary to achieve the 
objective of creating a healthier workplace environment. It is not the function of the penal 
system to render the loss of freedom more unpleasant.132 A complete ban is a 
disproportionate response to the situation. The Department of Corrections have stated that 
“during their imprisonment, prison cells become the inmate’s residence”.133 No 
government has taken the step of prohibiting smoking in private homes, despite evidence 
of detrimental health risks to non-smokers, including children.134 Smoke-free policies 
should not be moral statements; they should restrict where and when people can smoke 
rather than restricting the choice whether to smoke or not.135 The scheme of the Smoke-
free Environments Act accords with this notion, as the stated purposes of the legislation do 
not include the reduction of smoking by smokers.136 Smoking is only regulated in the 
community to the extent necessary to prevent harm to non-smokers, and I argue that complete 
bans on smoking in prisons are hard to justify.137 
 
The corrections system has no overriding health focus. In contrast, workplaces with 
significant health objectives such as hospitals allow smoking in outdoor areas. This still 
serves the aim of protecting third parties from smoke. In B v Waitemata District Health 
Board, psychiatric patients alleged that a smoking ban curtailed their rights.138 Asher J 
concluded that the objective of protecting others from the harm of smoking justified any 
curtailment of rights caused by the policy.139 However there were unique considerations at 
play, due to the health-care nature of the facility. The ban covered only indoor areas 
                                                 
131 “Tobacco victory goes up in a puff of smoke” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 4 July 
2013). 
132 John Belgrave and Mel Smith Ombudsmen’s Investigation of the Department of Corrections In Relation 
to the Detention and Treatment of Prisoners (2 December 2005) at 6. 
133 Taylor v Manager of Auckland Prison, above n 4, at [14]. 
134 Mackay, above n 123. 
135 Re CM (Judicial Review) [2013] CSOH 143. 
136 Progressive Meats Ltd v Ministry of Health, above n 75, at [39]. 
137 Mackay, above n 123. 
138 B v Waitemata District Health Board, above n 79, at [1]. 
139 At [95]. 
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meaning patients that were well enough could leave the building and smoke. The prison 
ban covers all areas of the grounds. The principles that previously guided smoking policies 
within prisons required that non-smokers would not be required to share cells with smokers 
where “reasonably practicable”.140 I argue this approach is sufficient to serve the statutory 
purpose of reducing the “exposure of people who do not themselves smoke to any 
detrimental effect on their health caused by smoking by others”.141 Allowing smoking in 
open areas and cells does not render it impossible to achieve the objective of protecting 
non-smokers. 
 
The Supreme Court has recognised that the application of s 23(5) to particular cases will 
be influenced by the jurisprudence under the overseas human rights instruments.142 The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee has said that prisoners must be guaranteed the 
same conditions as for that of free persons subject to the restrictions that are unavoidable 
in a closed environment.143 A purpose of the Corrections Act is that facilities should be 
operated in line with rules and regulations based on the United Nations Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.144 These rules state that institutions should seek to 
minimise any differences between prison life and liberty that tend to lessen the 
responsibility of the prisoners or the respect due to their dignity as human beings.145 
Removing the right to smoke is preventing prisoners from engaging in activity lawfully 
enjoyed by a significant portion of New Zealand adults, lessening individual autonomy.146 
 
 
 
                                                 
140 Smoke-free Environments Act, s 6A. 
141 Smoke-free Environments Act, s 3A. 
142 Taunoa v Attorney-General, above n 109, at [179]. 
143 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 21 (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, 2009, 1992) at [3]. 
144 Corrections Act, s 5(1)(b). 
145 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners Res 663C(XXIV) & 2076(LXII) 
(Approved 31 July 1957 & 13 May 1977). 
146 The latest 2012/2013 Ministry of Health Survey found that 17.6% of New Zealand adults are classified as 
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I argue that there is no reasonable justification for a complete smoking ban in prisons. The 
ban goes further than necessary to achieve the legislative aim of creating a healthier 
workplace environment, and impinges on the inherent dignity of a prisoner by curbing a 
freedom of choice to engage in a lawful activity, even for remand prisoners yet to stand 
trial.  
4 Amendments Unduly Exclude Review by Courts 
Taylor did not claim any relief in the second decision and therefore the High Court did not 
rule on the effect of the ouster clauses contained in the regulations that are now the law.147  
The LAC Guidelines provide that legislation should not “substantively limit” the 
availability of judicial review without a compelling reason to do so.148 It is generally 
desirable for people to be able to challenge decisions that affect their rights or interests 
(such as removing the freedom to smoke in their prison cell) by way of judicial review. An 
ouster clause entirely excludes the courts’ jurisdiction and therefore impinges on the courts’ 
important role to review the law. The relevant ouster clause is s 179AA: 
179AA Status of certain rules and regulations relating to smoking in prisons 
... 
(2) On and from 12 February 2013, no proceedings may be brought against the Crown 
questioning the validity of any rules or regulations referred to in subsection (1). 
 
The relevant rule referred to in subsection (1) is any rule made before 12 February 2013 by 
a prison manager under s 33 forbidding prisoners from smoking or possessing tobacco. The 
regulations referred to are regulations 4 and 6 of the Corrections Amendment Regulations 
2012. 
 
The courts have always been hostile to ouster clauses, and will construe them 
restrictively.149 There is a presumption that the legislature did not intend to remove the 
power of the courts to engage in judicial review.150 Section 27(2) of the New Zealand Bill 
                                                 
147 Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [36]. 
148 Legislation Advisory Committee, above n 80, at 13.7.1. 
149 Joseph, above n 54, at 909. 
150 Bulk Gas Users Group v Attorney-General [1983] NZLR 129 (CA) at [133]. 
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of Rights Act secures the ability to bring judicial review proceedings against the Crown, 
and the ouster clause in this situation seems to be inconsistent with this. The Bill of Rights, 
by virtue of s 6, requires an ouster clauses to be interpreted to permit judicial review, unless 
the only meaning the provision can bear excludes judicial review.151 It is also likely that s 
27(3) requires careful consideration to be given to any claimed immunities of the Crown.152 
However where statutory wording is clear the court will not override the provision.153 
Section 179AA imposes a clear bar to proceedings questioning the validity of the rules and 
regulations.  
 
The ouster clause compounds the impact of the retrospective nature of the provisions in 
SOP 171. As stated earlier, prisoners could have been punished for smoking when it was 
not unlawful at the time of the offence. This ouster clause will prevent them from 
challenging the validity of disciplinary measures, as the Corrections Minister indicated in 
the house this would amount to a challenge on the validity of the rules and regulations.154 
An adverse disciplinary record, unable to be challenged, may have a negative effect on 
consideration of parole.155 
 
Potential may remain for a future claim of inconsistency with s 23(5) of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act. This would not be a “proceeding questioning the validity of any rules 
or regulations” and therefore may not be precluded by the ouster clause contained in 
s179AA of the Corrections Act. As I have argued, I believe that there is a potential 
inconsistency. The case for granting a declaration of inconsistency may be strengthened 
here, particularly because the inconsistent provision was introduced once the opportunity 
for a s 7 report had passed.156 
 
                                                 
151 GDS Taylor Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective (3rd ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2014) at 2.63; 
Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2005] 1 NZLR 690 at [99]. 
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154 (13 February 2013) 687 NZPD 7832. 
155 Taylor v Attorney-General, above n 4, at [14]. 
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V Conclusion 
The process of removing smoking from prisons has been flawed from the outset. Despite 
the nature of the policy, the ban was not introduced through Parliamentary sanctioned 
primary legislation following the usual public submission and enactment processes. 
Instead, two attempts were made to incorporate the ban in delegated legislation. These 
statutory instruments were twice held to be unlawful, invalid and of no effect in successive 
judgments. 
 
These judgments are not robust, primarily because of a superficial analysis of the legislative 
context. Both judgments strained the interpretation of s 6A of the Smoke-free 
Environments Act by assuming that the wording amounted to an affirmation of the right to 
smoke. My analysis is that the statutory language more comfortably bears an interpretation 
allowing prisoners to smoke in cells, but also allowing a policy to prevent this. I have found 
support for this interpretation in the legislative history, which was not canvassed in either 
judgment.  
 
It might be argued that prisoners forfeit many rights by their status of prisoners. This is an 
inevitable consequence of imprisonment, and the need for the safe management of a prison 
environment. However, I have argued that the removal of the freedom to smoke in prison 
cells and outside in prison yards was a step too far. Tobacco traditionally serves a range of 
functions in prisons including as a symbol of freedom in a group with few rights and 
privileges.157 Prisoners are especially vulnerable to curtailment of their rights and the 
legislative implementation precluded the opportunity for the Attorney-General to assess 
the ban for compliance. Although there is now a statutory bar against claims questioning 
the validity of these regulations, the ouster clause may leave room for a claim that the ban 
was inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. 
 
 
 
                                                 
157 T Butler and others “Should smoking be banned in prisons?” (2007) 16(5) Tob Control 291. 
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